Allocation in Practice

How do we allocate scarcere sources? How do we fairly allocate costs? These are two pressing challenges facing society today. I discuss two recent projects at NICTA concerning resource and cost allocation. In the first, we have been working with FoodBank Local, a social startup working in collaboration with food bank charities around the world to optimise the logistics of collecting and distributing donated food. Before we can distribute this food, we must decide how to allocate it to different charities and food kitchens. This gives rise to a fair division problem with several new dimensions, rarely considered in the literature. In the second, we have been looking at cost allocation within the distribution network of a large multinational company. This also has several new dimensions rarely considered in the literature.Comment: To appear in Proc. of 37th edition of the German Conference on Artificial Intelligence (KI 2014), Springer LNC

A Hedged Monte Carlo Approach to Real Option Pricing

In this work we are concerned with valuing optionalities associated to invest or to delay investment in a project when the available information provided to the manager comes from simulated data of cash flows under historical (or subjective) measure in a possibly incomplete market. Our approach is suitable also to incorporating subjective views from management or market experts and to stochastic investment costs. It is based on the Hedged Monte Carlo strategy proposed by Potters et al (2001) where options are priced simultaneously with the determination of the corresponding hedging. The approach is particularly well-suited to the evaluation of commodity related projects whereby the availability of pricing formulae is very rare, the scenario simulations are usually available only in the historical measure, and the cash flows can be highly nonlinear functions of the prices.Comment: 25 pages, 14 figure

Market Conduct and Endogenous Lobbying: Evidence from the U.S. Mobile Telecommunications Industry

This paper empirically explores the relationship between firms' market behavior and their lobbying activities in a regulated market. In particular, we investigate whether the amount of contributions offered by cellular service providers to fund the campaigns of political parties affected market conduct in the early US mobile telecommunications industry. We structurally estimate market interactions while taking the potential endogeneity of lobbying decisions into account. Our results show that competition was more intense in those states where campaign contributions by the cellular industry have been higher. Furthermore, we reject the hypothesis that lobbying activities can be regarded as exogenous in the study of market conduct. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, LLC 2007lobbying, campaign contributions, conjectural variations, mobile telecommunications, U.S., D72, L13, L51, L96, C31,